The first report covered data from June to November 1983. The final report will compare the first two reports, analyze any changes and make recommendations on the use of the HRI technology at Jacksonville.
Other aspects of the overall solid waste to energy project being conducted by NCEL under the sponsorship of the Naval Facilities Engineering
Command include a study of Refuse Derived Fuel (RDF) use in Navy fossil fuel boilers; a survey method for estimating solid waste generation at shore facilities; methodology for predicting the economic feasibility of HRI technology at shore facilities; and a study of the HRi at NS Mayport.
For information on these reports contact: in Federally owned fossil fuel-fired energy systems. The Naval Air Station (NAS) Jacksonville Heat Recovery Incinerator (HRI) installation is one of two Naval facilities in Florida designed to recover energy from solid waste generated on base. The other is located at Naval Station Mayport. By the incineration of waste materials, the HRI is intended to reduce landfill problems and generate stem to be used by Naval activities.
*1 The purpose of this task is to evaluate the performance of the HRI in tems of reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) parameters, long term cost-effectiveness, and overall thermal efficiency (TE). Results will be '-S used to develop Navy criteria for the optimum plant design in the 50 ton per day (TPD) range.
SCOPE
This task involved screening, condensing, and analyzing operational data logged by plant operating personnel for a 6-month period (December 1982 through May 1983 . This data was used to compute all RAM parameters. Due to administrative reasons and equipment problems, steam was not produced during this evaluation period. Thus cost-effectiveness and TE parameters were not determined. Samples of the data sheets are given in Appendix A. 
SUMMARY
The and this dhl iit iV did titt t-I ftct IIRI peri-rtnatICt .
The nominal discharge capacity of 3 TPH was not achieved during this period. Plant operating personnel reduced the screw auger and carriage drive speed in an attempt to mitigate jamming problems (Discussed in Section 6.2). In addition, an estimated 215 hours of incineration time was accrued by direct feeding from the tipping floor (bypassing the storage bin) due to "bin empty" conditions; the "bin empty" conditions resulting from breakdown of the processing subsystem.
4.3
Incineration Subsystem. The operating scenario of the incineration subsystem deviated significantly from its intended mission. This subsystem was designed to incinerate 2 TPH using two of three incinerators simultaneously with the other on standby (each incinerator has a nominal capacity of I TPH).
Only two incinerators were available during this evaluation period. Under no circumstances were they operated in tandem to incinerate solid waste. Furthermore, the subsystem operated at approximately 20 percent of capacity (0.40 versus 2 TPH). It is likely that this departure from the desired capacity had a positive influence on incinerator and ash conveyor reliability and maintainability (R&M) performance. During the 6-month period, the incinerator feed controls were operated manually by plant personnel. Examination of available data indicates that manual operation of the incinerator feed controls was performed in an effort to avoid maintenance problems with the automatic control circuit. Thus very little time was logged by automatic control circuit components (i.e., interlocks, limit switches, pushbutton switches, etc.).
4.4
Ash Removal Subsystem. The ash conveyor required the removal of ash from only one incinerator at a time due to the operating capabilities of the incineration subsystem. This had an effect of reducing the load stresses imposed on conveyor components by wet ash deposits. For this reason, its R&M performance under "intended conditions" could not be determined from ;ivajilablo 1:1t -1.
4.5
Steam Generation Subsystem. The steam generation subsystem was des',;ned to produce 6,280 pounds (lb) of steam per hour. Due to 1,-, ir 14-r , ' lv. i i problems and administrative decisions, no steam was produced during this period. created an operational profile that exhibi-ed a higher riitp of fqiiipmen~t fiuethan would be found in a normal consistent mode oi one ra t T".
5.2
Technical Discussion.
One of the primary purposes of this current -nz >r. tA s~'to provide input to develop guidelines for 3Mai1-i,cale S,)ili ~p lant design.
The initial six-month eialuation proi~~ae eti links" in the HRI system. In regard to these early observations, certain recowmendations were proposed to remedy the problems. The implementation of the resulting design changes are discussed in the following sections.
5.2.1
Processing Subsystem. The processing subsystem demonstrated the poorest reliability over the current six-month reporting period. This is expected since the processing subsystem is more functionally intricate than the other HRI subsystems. However, four failures in 175 hours of operation is unusually high for equipment that is predominantly mechanical in nature. The failure information revealed that all four failures that occurred were experienced by conveyor belt equipment (two broken belts, one broken belt clip, and one wornout idler roller bearing).
During the previous six-month reporting period, excessive wear of the flail mill shaft bearing was a problem. This problem was believed to be caused by dust and dirt contamination. Such contamination usually results in abrasive wear of the bearing surface and subsequent failure of the flail mill.
Plans were made to install a pressurized oil misting system on the shaft bearing assembly. This plan was implemented early in the current reporting period.
In theory, the oil misting system should decrease contaminant intrusion while also maintaining a cool operating temperature. Analysis of current reporting period data has revealed that no failures or maintenance actions involving flail mill shaft bearings occurred. Although a sufficient amount of flail mill operate time was not accrued to prove the success of the system, there is a high probability that the oil misting system has fulfilled the intended function. Shutdown of the HRI system (June 1983) prevented any further evaluation of the oil misting system.
Another problem of concern during the previous reporting period was the occurrence of various motor burnouts due to high operating temperatures
resulting from the accumulation of dust and dirt.
No motor burnouts or overheating problems were encountered during the current reporting period.
Improved preventive maintenance (cleaning, lubrication) may have contributed to these circumstances, but it must be considered that such a limited amount of operating time for the reporting period inhibited the formation of any reliable conclusions. 42 This, combined with substantial delay time waiting for parts led to excessive amount of downtime for incinerators number one and two. Current data did nat permit conclusive interpretation of these symptoms, but possible causes for this problem include the intense heat the doors are subjected to and the manner in .... which force is applied to operate the doors.
Incineration
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The hydraulic power systems of incinerators number one and two have experienced many hydraulic leaks and associated maintenance actions. This is common for hydraulic systems. The four hydraulic system failures resulted in complete loss of hydraulic power, leading to incinerator shutdown. Three of the four failures were attributed to hoses while one failure was caused by a 9 4'7;
hydraulic door cylinder. In a few other situations the hydraulic hoses were replaced due to leakage or wearout that indicated failure was imminenL.
Analysis of data during the previous reporting period disclosed a problem with the configuration of the hydraulic lines and component parts.
Inefficient routing and extended lengths of hosing led to maintenance problems.
Many of the hydraulic lines also were difficult to access for maintenance. To ameliorate these problems, hard piping was installed and reconfigured during the current reporting period. It is the view of the HRI q\ maintenance personnel that this action has made access for repairs more convenient while eliminating the problems with rubber hose durability.
Sufficient system operate time was not accrued following these design changes to provide for a reliable evaluation.
During the previous reporting period, the breaking off of thin chips of refractory material from the interior walls of the incinerators was a major problem. This material deterioration persisted through the current reporting period. It is believed that this process (spalling) is the result of frequent heating and cooling cycles. The intended mission of the incinerators calls for continuous operation of 120 hours per week. Without the interruptions of waste stream fluctuations and maintenance shutdowns, problems resulting from cyclic temperature variation would be minimized.
MAINTAINABILITY
Maintainability is defined as a characteristic of equipment design and installation which is expressed in terms of ease and economy of maintenance, availability of equipment, and accuracy in the performance of maintenance actions. This section evaluates the maintainability of the HRI during the 6-month evaluation period.
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6.1
Six-month Maintainability Parameters.
The following maintainability parameters (See Incineration 5.0 (7) 80.7 (12)
Ash Removal 8.5 (2) 170.6 (5) HRI Overall 6.6 (14) 40.4 (24) .4
The most significant maintenance burden during the current reporting period has been the incineration subsystem, which has experienced seven failures averaging five hours to repair and 12 maintenance actions. The seven failures included a wide range of break downs with no particular problematic trend standing out. Jammed ash rams and warped incinerator doors were the most troublesome maintenance actions, contributing to long equipment downtimes.
The processing subsystem also required considerable maintenance attention. Three of the four failures that occurred were conveyor belt wearouts.
Most of the maintenance action required by the processing subsystem also dealt with conveyor belt problems. Jams have been cause of maintenance action for the storage bin screw augers and the ash conveyor chain assembly. The storage bin discharge screw augers operate in tandem to discharge waste at the discharge end of the storage bin. Under normal conditions the two counterrotating screws discharge solid waste onto a conveyor belt. At the same time, the carriage upon which the screws are mounted traverses back and forth throughout the length of the storage bin. As waste builds inside the bin, jams periodically occur between the two screws. This type jam occurs most frequently near the discharge point.
.% Another type of jam occurs when the screws attempt to traverse through a big pile. The load of a large pile is often too great for the carriage drive unit. To combat these problems, plant operators have reduced the speed of the discharge operation and manually controlled the traversing motion to *i keep the screws at the edge of the solid waste pile. This requires increased manpower to perform incineration operations. Based upon the various problems experienced at this site, many which have been well-docunented before this analysis (i.e. nonuniform waste distribution inside bin, type of wastes and their affect on screws, discharge from bottom only), it is believed that the screw augers discharge method is not suitable for this type of solid waste processing applications.
One other maintenance design problem is the location of the storage bin J4 4feed conveyor motor. This drive motor at the top of the 14 foot high storage bin is mounted on the bin (pit) side of the conveyor belt rather than the catwalk side. This renders it inaccessible for preventive and corrective maintenance operations.
Ash conveyor jams are due largely to the deposit of unburned (or not completely burned) objects into the quench tank where they can get between the chain and sprockets. This problem is manifested by the chain jumping off the sprocket and is best controlled by minimizing the introduction of noncombustible solid waste material into the incinerators.
AVAILABILITY
Avail-ability is the unconditional probability that the system will be capable of operating at its specified level of performance when called upon to do so at any random point in time.
There are two types of availability that can be calculated, inherent and operational use availability. Inherent availability (A i ) is the probability that the system will be capable of operating at its specified level of performance when called upon to do so at any random point in time;
excluding logistics delays. It is expressed as:
Operate Time + Repair Time
Operational use availability (Au) is calculated by making use of logistics delays. The limitations of the data source utilized for this evaluation precludes the collection of logistics data, therefore operational use availability can not be calculated.
The IRR availability figures for the current reporting period are presented in Table 5 . ... ,.. .... ,'.., ,b... .. ,." ,... ,..,.., . . . ,
8.0
THEMArL EFFICIEN CY Durin8 this reporting period, no stem was produced due to various technical and administrative reasons. Solid waste was incinerated on an "as available" basis providing the appropriate equipment was operable. Since the TE equation compares the energy consumed to "steam produced" it is not possible to provide this parmter. Thus it is only possible to give an index of how much energy was consumed to fulfill solid waste incineration goals. Equations 1 through 6 provide for the computation of heat derived from the various energy sources.
Equation 7 is the sum total of the heat from these six sources.
All heat values are expressed in British Thermal Units (Btu).
Ine xy Consumption Equations. .. , , , . , , .. -. 
